



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

congruity and not to external authority, so that all his hearers will be edified and no modern mind will be offended. It is after all in the absence of dogmatism and of the arbitrary separation of biblical history and doctrine from ordinary experience and life that the appeal to the modern mind consists.

The last two chapters on the style and the passion of the preacher are well written for our day, when style is either neglected or too highly attempted, and when passion is either torn to tatters or is shunned with fear.

The book should be widely read by preachers who are still suspicious of modernism, and by intelligent laymen who would like a comprehensible statement of what modern thinking about religion really is. The point of view here given is greatly needed in all our religious educational work, especially in Sunday-school teaching.

THEODORE GERALD SOARES

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

A NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES¹

The plan of the latest encyclopedia of the philosophical sciences is itself illustrative of a phase of empirical logic. At a period when philosophy merely holds the mirror up to the controversial and highly specialized interests in learning and in life instead of supplying them with a unifying interpretation, it is the avowed purpose of this encyclopedia to provide a sort of tribunal for the foremost philosophical thinkers of various nationalities, in the hope that the comparison of the principles formulated by them will bring out the point of view common to all. In pursuance of this plan the first volume of the encyclopedia is given over to six papers on logic written by representatives of as many nationalities. After reading these extremely varied papers it is by no means easy to determine what is the net logical element common to the thinkers of Germany, America, France, Italy, Spain, and Russia, unless it be the apparent agreement that the essentials of logic transcend empirical limits, and hence depend very little, if at all, on the geographical, racial,

¹ *Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*. In Verbindung mit Wilhelm Windelband herausgegeben von Arnold Ruge. Erster Band: Logik. Inhalt: Wilhelm Windelband, Die Prinzipien der Logik; Josiah Royce, Die Prinzipien der Logik; Louis Couturat, Die Prinzipien der Logik; Benedetto Croce, Die Aufgaben der Logik; Frederigo Enriques, Die Probleme der Logik; N. Losskij, Die Umgestaltung des Bewusstseinsbegriffes in der modernen Erkenntnistheorie und ihre Bedeutung für die Logik. Erscheint in 2 Hälften. Tübingen: Mohr, 1912. Preis für den ganzen Band bei Vorausberechnung, M. 6; nach Erscheinen der 2. Hälfte, M. 7.

or political divisions of the world. With this apparent agreement in mind, the reader may, nevertheless, be tempted to speculate as to whether Professor Losskij's sharp discrimination between *analysis* as belonging exclusively to the subjective side, to the individual, a matter for psychology only, and *synthesis* as inhering solely in the objective side, a matter for logic only, may not answer to a stage of social and political development in which the individual as yet counts for nothing positively constructive, but is held in place by a traditional order which regards him as a possible source of disintegration. Coupled with this view of analysis and synthesis is the view of truth as essentially static, expressed by the same writer, to which corresponds a relatively static individual—truth conceived as an eternal, identical, and universally valid meaning attained not through the instrumentality of ideas but through contemplation.

At the opposite end of the logical spectrum presented in this volume is the paper by Professor Couturat, which is devoted mainly to symbolic logic. A strictly logical treatment of logic, the author explains, is impossible. Symbolic logic is not a new form of logic, but a continuation of logic conceived in the classical sense of the term, a normative science of the formal laws of correct thinking. Aristotle was in this sense the first "logistician." Symbolic logic possesses no mysterious virtue. It is an attempt to lay bare, in as sharp, rigorous, and clear a manner as possible, the fundamental forms of thought.

Professor Croce begins his paper with an attack on "logistics," or symbolic logic, as dealing with the problem of logic as if it consisted in making an inventory of rules and formulae by dint of which to further the discovery of truth. It is the continuation of the *logica utens* of the schoolmen, a logic which is not without value, but which when in full bloom, or rather when it put forth its thorns in the sun, was intolerably pedantic and unprofitable. *Logica utens* can never be a *logica docens*. A complex of rules and formulae is not a science. By logic Professor Croce understands, in the Hegelian spirit, a doctrine, a theory, a science, the aim of which is to grasp the essential nature of thought and of the other sciences. Logic, or the *amor dei intellectualis*, and philosophy are one. Its field is that of history and of art as well as that of science, and in the philosophy of value it merges with that of religion. To the special mathematical and physical sciences Professor Croce assigns with a patrician air the lowly place of serving as the librarians and cataloguers of the books of fundamental truth which they neither write nor read, the reader of these books being philosophy.

The only paper in the entire series which develops to any considerable degree the interrelations of psychology and logic is that by Professor Windelband. The first foundations of logic, he holds, must be laid by psychology. The mental processes which logic involves need to be analyzed, not merely from the standpoint of theoretical psychology, but genetically. And yet logic has to do with the validity or truth of ideas, not with their development. How the feeling of belief is produced needs to be studied psychologically. Truth itself is a value derived from practical needs. The truth value needs to be studied also from the standpoint of social psychology. The logical demand for universality roots in the unity that is social; and the social character of knowledge shows itself in its use of speech as its most adequate vehicle and as the medium in which we learn to think. And yet all these scientific studies furnish only the materials in which logic orients itself, not its principles. At this point Professor Windelband retreats from the fertile plain of the sciences to the heights of Kant. The principles of logic are to be found, as Kant found them, in the principle of synthesis: logic is the science of reason. The advance of logical theory depends upon the isolation and analysis of the forms of thought, and passes through pure or formal logic, through methodology or the logical unity of the sciences, to *Erkenntnistheorie*, the higher unity through which only can we determine whether, and how far, and in what sense, human knowledge lays hold of that transcendent truth which hovers before knowledge that is not yet philosophy.

Among the various strands which Professor Royce has woven into the logical fabric which answers to the position of absolute idealism, or of absolute pragmatism, as he now seems willing to call it, two are of especial importance, if they do not constitute its very warp and woof. They are (1) the inference of order, of system, in all scientific work, finding expression first in classification, then in comparative and statistical methods, and finally in the complete unity of theory and practice in certain fields of the physical sciences; and (2) the contributions of modern mathematical logic, particularly with reference to the concepts of relationship, series, and class. Logic, one might say following Professor Royce, is the will to classify. At all events, without a will to classify, the world would have no classes; and if no classes, then no relations; no relations, no ordering; and without ordering, no world at all. We both construct and discover classifications. The fundamental types of the ordering of experience are so native to our denying and affirming, relating and classifying rational activity, that the very attempt to rule them out of

our world involves a demonstration of their existence. They are seen no longer to rest on self-evident axioms. They are not derivable from empirical and contingent experience. They imply a realm of ideal, that is, of possible, objects, which is infinitely rich, which comprises system like the ordering system of numbers, and which obeys laws which are the same laws as one obeys who decides between yes and no and who determines the logical characteristics of classes and relations.

The following subjects are announced for the subsequent volumes of this encyclopedia: ethics, aesthetics, the philosophy of history, the history of philosophy, and the philosophy of religion.

W. C. GORE

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

PERSIAN, INDIAN, AND ISLAMIC STUDIES

Wilson's translation of the second book of the *Maṣnavī*¹ is an important addition to our knowledge of the greatest Ṣūfī work by the greatest of all Ṣūfī poets. Wilson has almost entirely sacrificed the poetic quality of the original to accuracy of translation. The notes though very full are no more elaborate than the veiled sentences of the original require in order to make them intelligible to one who is not versed in the conventionalities of Persian and especially of Ṣūfī diction.

Though the *Maṣnavī* is filled with quotations from the Qur'ān, yet its undogmatic and very eclectic pantheism is in sharp contrast to the stern theism of Mahomet. Though many passages in the Qur'ān do lend themselves to a mystical interpretation, it is impossible to accept the view commonly held by Ṣūfīs themselves that Ṣūfism really represents the esoteric doctrine of the Prophet. The influence of neo-Platonism is not to be questioned, though to what extent it is to be assumed is not yet certain. The traits of mysticism the world over are so similar that many of the Ṣūfī doctrines may be independent in origin. Interesting in this regard is the chapter on Ṣūfism by Shaikh Muhammed Iqbal in his *The Developments of Metaphysics in Persia* (1908). The only foreign influence admitted by him is that of the Christian ascetic. More and more, however, is it becoming clear that certain phases of Buddhism and of the Vedānta and Yoga exerted a very appreciable influence upon the development of Ṣūfī thought. The most important discussion of this phase of the problem since von Kremer is Goldziher's *Vorlesungen über den Islam* (1910), pp. 139-200. We know almost nothing definite

¹ *The Maṣnavī*. By Jalālu 'd- Din Rūmī. Book II. Translated for the first time from the Persian into prose, with a commentary. By C. E. Wilson. London: Probsthain's Oriental Series. Vols. III and IV (1910).